Mirage of WMDs: The lessons of Iraq amid Iran-Israel war

In the early 2000s, the world was gripped by a narrative that would reshape the Middle East and alter global geopolitics: Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was allegedly harboring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and posed an imminent threat to international security. This claim, championed by the United States and its allies, served as the primary justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Two decades later, as tensions escalate in the ongoing Israel-Iran conflict, revisiting the Iraq War offers critical lessons about the dangers of flawed intelligence, geopolitical agendas, and the consequences of military intervention.

Today, we will shed light on how the world was misled by WMD reports, the fall of Saddam Hussein, and the relevance of these events in today’s volatile Middle East.

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The WMD Narrative: A Case Built on Sand

The argument for the invasion of Iraq was based on claims that Saddam Hussein’s government had active chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. President George W. Bush described Iraq, together with Iran and North Korea, during his State of the Union address in January 2002, as being part of an “axis of evil” that was planning to acquire WMDs and was a supporter of terrorism. Vice President Dick Cheney in August 2002 asserted with certainty that “Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction” and was stockpiling them to use against the U.S. and its allies. These claims were supported by intelligence reports, such as a 2002 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate that claimed Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger, constructing mobile weapons labs, and accumulating up to 500 tons of chemical agents.

However, these claims were built on shaky foundations. Much of the intelligence relied on outdated information, unverified sources, and defectors with questionable credibility, such as members of the Iraqi National Congress. A notable example was the testimony of Hussein Kamel al-Majid, Iraq’s former WMD program director, who defected in 1995 and revealed that Iraq had destroyed its chemical and biological stockpiles post-1991 Gulf War, a fact later corroborated but ignored in the rush to war. Reports of Iraq attempting to procure uranium from Niger were debunked by former diplomat Joseph Wilson, who found no evidence of such transactions, yet the claim persisted in Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address.

The United Nations weapons inspections, led by Hans Blix under Resolution 1441 in 2002, found no evidence of active WMD programs or stockpiles, noting only “proactive but not always immediate” cooperation from Iraq. Despite this, the U.S. and U.K. dismissed the findings, citing Iraq’s history of deception and alleging hidden stockpiles. The media amplified these claims, with outlets like The New York Times publishing stories—later discredited—about Iraq’s supposed nuclear ambitions. The public, still reeling from the 9/11 attacks, was primed to believe Iraq was linked to terrorism, despite no evidence connecting Saddam to al-Qaeda or the attacks.

The Invasion and Its Aftermath

On March 20, 2003, a U.S.-led coalition launched Operation Iraqi Freedom, a “shock and awe” campaign that toppled Saddam’s regime within weeks. The invasion was initially celebrated, symbolized by the toppling of Saddam’s statue in Baghdad’s Firdos Square. However, the failure to find WMDs quickly eroded public support. By 2005, a presidential commission concluded that U.S. intelligence on Iraqi WMDs was “completely flawed,” with “not one bit” of evidence supporting the claims. Subsequent investigations, including the 2004 Duelfer Report, confirmed that Iraq had dismantled its WMD programs in the early 1990s under UN supervision, though Saddam maintained ambiguity to deter regional rivals like Iran.

The absence of WMDs exposed the invasion’s shaky pretext, sparking debates over whether the Bush administration manipulated intelligence or was itself misled. Critics, including former intelligence officials, argued that the administration cherry-picked data to justify a predetermined goal of regime change, while others, like *Foreign Affairs*, noted that Bush officials genuinely feared a collapsing containment policy and Saddam’s potential to restart WMD programs.

The war’s cost was staggering: over 4,700 U.S. and allied troop deaths, more than 100,000 Iraqi civilian casualties, and an estimated $2.9 trillion in expenses. The power vacuum fueled sectarian violence, a Sunni insurgency, and the rise of groups like ISIL, destabilizing Iraq for years.

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The End of Saddam Hussein

Saddam Hussein, who had ruled Iraq since 1979 with an iron fist, became a fugitive after Baghdad’s fall.

On December 13, 2003, U.S. special forces captured him hiding in a spider hole near Tikrit. His trial, conducted by an Iraqi court, began in 2005, charging him with “crimes against humanity”.

The trial was fraught with controversy, marked by Saddam’s defiant outbursts and allegations of sectarian bias in the judiciary. On November 5, 2006, he was found guilty and sentenced to death. On December 30, 2006, Saddam was hanged in Baghdad, clutching a Quran. His execution, marred by leaked footage showing taunts by his haters but Sunnis vowed revenge.

Lessons for the Israel-Iran Conflict

The Iraq War’s reliance on flawed WMD intelligence holds stark relevance for the ongoing Israel-Iran conflict, which escalated in 2025 with Israeli strikes on Iranian military and nuclear sites. Unlike Iraq in 1980, which invaded Iran under Saddam’s aggressive ambitions, Israel’s actions are framed as defensive, targeting Iran’s nuclear program and Revolutionary Guard facilities to prevent a perceived existential threat. However, the Iraq precedent warns of the risks of acting on unverified intelligence. Reports of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, like those of Iraq’s WMDs, rely heavily on satellite imagery, defectors, and intelligence assessments, which can be misinterpreted or exaggerated.

Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, which delayed Saddam’s nuclear ambitions, is often cited as a successful preemptive action, but it also fueled Iraq’s resolve to pursue covert programs. Today, Iran’s nuclear program, reportedly damaged by Israeli strikes in Natanz, remains a flashpoint. The Iraq War showed that military intervention, even if initially successful, can lead to unintended consequences—sectarian strife, regional instability, and empowered adversaries. Iran’s backing of militias in Iraq, which have targeted Israel since 2023, complicates the current conflict, echoing the proxy dynamics that followed Saddam’s fall.

The Iraq War was a cautionary story of how fear, inaccurate intelligence, and geopolitical interests can result in disastrous choices. The failure to find WMDs undermined the credibility of the American-led invasion, resulted in the deaths of numerous innocent lives, and destabilized the Middle East with consequences still felt today. Saddam Hussein’s downfall unleashed pandemonium that neither Iraq nor the region was equipped to manage. As the Israel-Iran war plays out, the world needs to learn from Iraq: confirm intelligence carefully, challenge stories of threats looming on the horizon, and weigh the long-term price of war.