On Friday, Director General ISPR Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry did something officials in his position rarely do: he said, plainly, that people are working to make Balochistan look worse than it is. He’s right to call this out. Every insurgency fights on two fronts. One is fought with rifles and IEDs. The other is fought with rumor and a video clip stripped of context, and for years that second front was left largely uncontested, letting a group with nothing to offer the province but bloodshed shape the narrative by default. Friday’s briefing was the state finally refusing to let that stand.
The numbers make the case. This year, security forces ran 40,348 intelligence based operations, averaging over 194 a day, with 31,080 in Balochistan alone and 7,177 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Around 2,084 confirmed terrorists were killed, roughly ten a day, the highest daily rate on record. For every soldier or officer lost this year, forces are now taking down two and a half terrorists, up from two last year. That is not luck. It reflects a force that has stopped giving an outmatched, directionless enemy room to operate.
The human cost, though, was laid out honestly rather than glossed over. Of 3,145 terrorism incidents in 2026, 819 Pakistanis were killed: 303 soldiers, 194 police and law enforcement personnel, and 322 civilians. That is four lives a day. Every one of those deaths sits squarely on the BLA, an organization that has all but given up trying to fight security forces directly because it keeps losing, and instead preys on civilians, laborers, commuters, and infrastructure: people and places that cannot shoot back. There is no cause, no grievance, that excuses that choice. It is simply an organization with no real strategy left, hunting the softest targets it can find and calling that a war.
The BLA does not operate on its own either, and the DG ISPR did not pretend otherwise. He pointed to sardars who threaten more violence any time the state moves against their smuggling and extortion rackets, and said plainly that support for this violence is coming from across two borders: India and Afghanistan, both of which have made terrorism the common thread linking them to the bloodshed in Balochistan. This is not a new charge. ISPR has for months laid out how Afghan territory is being used to move fighters and supplies for attacks inside Pakistan, and how Indian sponsorship sits behind outfits operating under cover names like Fitna al Hindustan. Set beside the sardari system in the same briefing, the picture is complete: a local elite manufacturing grievance at home, and two hostile states next door supplying the weapons, the money, and the cover to keep it burning.
The sharpest part of the briefing was the DG ISPR’s willingness to name who else has been feeding this violence closer to home. Balochistan’s instability, he said, comes down to elitism and a feudal tribal system built for one purpose: keeping a poor man’s son a servant instead of a student, someone driving a Land Cruiser and carrying a Kalashnikov for someone else’s militia rather than building a life of his own. That is not a minor accusation. It says outright that part of Balochistan’s traditional leadership has treated the safety of its own people as a bargaining chip, worth something only when it can be traded for patronage, protection rackets, and control of the Levies Force. For decades that leverage rested on one threat: deal with us, or watch the province burn. The DG ISPR’s answer was overdue: the state will not sit across the table from middlemen who profit from keeping Balochistan unstable. The people of Balochistan are the actual stakeholders here, he said, not the feudal lords who have spent generations speaking for them without asking them anything.
He tied that stance back to the Constitution, invoking Article 5’s line that loyalty to the state is every citizen’s basic duty, a reminder that rights without obligations are not really rights. And he backed the words with action, announcing that the Frontier Corps in Balochistan will split into three divisions, adding FC Balochistan West to secure the mineral corridor from Chagai down to Karachi, alongside the existing North and South commands. It is a statement of intent: the state plans to protect the development projects the BLA keeps attacking, not retreat from them.
The BLA has no vision for Balochistan beyond violence. The feudal tribal networks that feed it have no plan for the province beyond protecting their own grip on it. And the foreign patrons behind both, in New Delhi and in Kabul, have every incentive to keep Balochistan bleeding rather than building. A briefing willing to say all of that plainly, backed by numbers instead of slogans, is not propaganda. It is the state finally describing the fight in Balochistan the way it actually looks on the ground.